



## Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

February 27, 2003

### MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

FROM: John Evans, Facility Representative Program Manager

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John Evans".

SUBJECT: Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report

Attached is the Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (PIs) Quarterly Report covering the period from October to December 2002. Data for these indicators are gathered by Field elements quarterly per DOE-STD-1063-2000, *Facility Representatives*, and reported to Headquarters program offices for evaluation and feedback in order to improve the Facility Representative Program.

The format of the report is changed from past reports. Information will now be provided according to the major offices having field or site office Facility Representative programs: National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Office of Environmental Management (EM), and the Office of Science (SC).

The percentage of fully qualified Facility Representatives in EM and SC is 96%, and in NNSA is 69%. The DOE goal is 75%. Staffing levels for all three organizations continue to be below the 100% goal, but during the quarter improved to 95% at EM sites, 88% at SC sites, and 81% at NNSA sites. The overall attrition rate from the program in 2002 was 9%, which is less than the average of 13% from previous years. Of the 18 Facility Representatives who left the program in 2002, 11 stayed within the Department. Of these, 5 were promoted to management positions and 6 made lateral transfers to other Department organizations.

Current Facility Representative information and past quarterly reports are accessible via the Internet at our web site (<http://www.facrep.org>). Should you have any questions or comments on this report, please contact me at 202-586-3887.

Attachment



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Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report  
February 27, 2003

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## ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SITES

### Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (4QCY2002)

<u>Field or Ops Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTE Level</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
Carlsbad	1	1	1	100	0	100	100	60	65
Idaho	19	19	18	95	0	94	94	41	82
Oak Ridge (EM)	20	17	17	85	0	100	100	25	30
OH/Fernald	6	6	6	100	0	83	83	43	70
OH/Miamisburg	4	4	4	100	0	100	100	39	59
OH/West Valley	2	2	2	100	0	100	100	28	58
Richland	21	21	19	90	0	100	100	39	69
River Protection	7	7	7	100	0	100	100	51	78
Rocky Flats	15	15	15	100	0	95	95	55	75
Savannah River	35	35	34	97	0	97	94	42	77
<b>EM Site Totals</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>68</b>
<b>DOE GOALS</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>&gt;75</b>	<b>&gt;40</b>	<b>&gt;60</b>

\* % Field Time is defined as the number of hours spent in the plant/field divided by the total available work hours in the quarter. The total available work hours is the actual number of hours a Facility Representative works in a calendar quarter, including overtime hours. It does not include leave time (sick, annual, or other) or holidays.

\*\* % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

### Highlights of EM Facility Representative (FR) Accomplishments:

- At OH/Miamisburg, an FR worked with the contractor to resolve a BIO concern regarding adequate safety documentation for contaminated materials stored in Sealand containers. Also, an FR discovered the probable cause of a contamination incident and recommended a corrective action for precautions during overhead work, which would preclude future incidents.
- At OH/Fernald, FRs performed an assessment of rail operations and the inspection/maintenance of equipment. Timely repair and inspection of equipment was identified as a site-wide issue. As a result, site wide corrective actions were implemented. Also, FRs identified significant QA software concerns during a start-up review at the silos project. The software configuration management issue was determined to be a site-wide concern.
- At OH/West Valley, FRs participated on a surveillance of the sealing of the Process Mechanical Cell hatch and the vacuuming of the tunnel in the Fuel Receiving and Storage Area. Also, FRs participated on an assessment of training requirements and hazards analysis for the Extraction Cell-2 (XC-2) Project.
- At Oak Ridge (EM), the FRs at the following locations completed qualifications: Portsmouth, Paducah, and Y-12. All Oak Ridge (EM) FRs are now fully qualified.
- At Richland, four FRs supported the DOE ORR for startup of the Fuel Transfer System at the K Basins, including serving as the ORR team leader. The ORR report recommended the RL Manager authorize operation of the system upon correction and verification of six pre-start findings. Also, a T Plant FR performed a surveillance on radiological work practices and determined radiological controls were inadequately developed, implemented, and failed to minimize spread of radioactivity during high-risk cell cleanout activities.
- At River Protection, while conducting a facility walk through, an FR noted that there were numerous temporary weather protection structures that had been built without being reviewed for adequate structural support or fire danger. After review by contractor engineers, some structures were removed and others were rebuilt. Also, FRs identified issues related to implementation of dome load controls for inactive miscellaneous underground storage tanks. The TSR administrative controls were not applied as required to restrict load additions on tanks outside the tank farm boundary. Corrective actions were implemented to ensure load additions were adequately controlled.
- At Savannah River, the FRs at the Tank Farms and F Canyon performed a Readiness Assessment of the contractor's preparation to perform a transfer of Am-Cm material from F Canyon to the Tank Farms. Also, an FR found 41 containers of reusable shielding being stored in deteriorating containers. These boxes had been in this area for a long time and one box was reading a maximum of 1000 mrem/hr on contact. As a result, all boxes were overpacked in new containers.

## NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION SITES

### Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (4QCY2002)

Site Office	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTE Level</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
Kansas City	4	4	4	100	0	75	75	25	65
Livermore	10	10	9	90	0	100	67	35	63
Los Alamos	17	16	15	88	0	100	60	43	73
Nevada	12	10	10	83	0	100	70	33	58
Pantex	15	13	10	67	0	100	80	37	64
Sandia	12	11	8	73	0	100	75	33	64
Savannah River	3	3	3	100	0	100	100	41	68
Y-12	11	9	9	82	0	78	56	53	91
<b>NNSA Site Totals</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>69</b>
<b>DOE GOALS</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>&gt;75</b>	<b>&gt;40</b>	<b>&gt;60</b>

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### Highlights of NNSA Facility Representative (FR) Accomplishments:

- At Livermore, FRs worked closely with an outside team on the institutional review of the Bldg 332 Emergency Power System (EPS) to review implementation of the emergency power and nuclear safety requirements. The review included the implementation of SAR requirements and the physical condition of the EPS, which appeared to be excellent. The results confirmed that, in general, requirements are appropriately implemented in the field, although a number of inconsistencies were identified in the formality of documenting weaknesses.
- At Pantex, FRs led and participated in Readiness Assessments on: (1) B61 Mod 7 emergent work; (2) implementation of new authorization basis controls related to fire protection; and (3) implementation of new authorization basis controls related to transportation of nuclear explosives and nuclear material. Three FRs completed triennial requalification.
- At Los Alamos, an FR at the Radiochemistry Facility identified improper (i.e., less conservative) flammability alarm set points during field verifications of the Safety Evaluation Report. Also, an FR identified work control weaknesses in an on-going high voltage work activity at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center, resulting in the facility curtailing work activities and conducting a formal event investigation. The FR suggested the facility establish a fulltime electrical safety officer position due to significant electrical hazards and recent events.
- At Kansas City, FRs identified deficiencies in Pressure Vessel Safety inspections and relief valves. Also, FRs identified emergency light deficiencies in construction areas and the need for fireproofing expansion joint openings.
- At Nevada, an FR was instrumental in the identification and cleanup of beryllium at the Hazardous Spill Center. Also, an FR was proactive in identifying potential low-flying aircraft hazards and providing GPS coordinates to the NTS Airspace Management Group.
- At Sandia, two FRs completed full qualification, resulting in additional FR coverage of SNL Accelerator and Light Laboratory Facilities. Sandia FRs updated the FR Risk-Based Assessment Plan to reflect completion of 47 Walkthroughs/Assessments of Sandia operations and to reflect changes in assessment priorities.
- At Y-12, FRs worked with the contractor to account for fire system gage accuracy for safety class and safety significant fire systems, to ensure adequate fire system pressure to mitigate consequences to the public. The contractor had not been accounting for fire system gage accuracy when checking minimum fire suppression system pressure. Minimum pressure is required to ensure adequate flow to suppress a fire. Also, FRs monitored EUO Wet Chemistry restart preparations and noted several issues that would preclude satisfactory performance. The problems included improper valve lineups, inadequate procedural prerequisites, and over simulation during practice operations. After several follow-up discussions with EUO management, operating personnel corrected the practices and started to exhibit excellent conduct of operations practices.

## OFFICE OF SCIENCE SITES

### Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (4QCY2002)

<u>Area/Ops Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTE Level</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
Ames	1	1	1	100	0	100	100	40	75
Argonne-East	5	5	5	100	0	100	100	40	75
Argonne-West	3	3	3	100	0	100	100	29	62
Brookhaven	6	6	6	100	0	100	100	33	81
Fermi	2	2	2	100	0	50	50	38	82
Oak Ridge (NE facilities)	5	5	3	60	0	100	100	62	72
Oak Ridge (ORNL)	3	2	2	67	0	100	100	66	79
Princeton	1	1	1	100	0	100	100	53	69
<b>SC Site Totals</b>	26	25	23	<b>88</b>	0	96	<b>96</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>DOE GOALS</b>	-	-	-	<b>100</b>	-	-	<b>&gt;75</b>	<b>&gt;40</b>	<b>&gt;60</b>

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### Highlights of Science Facility Representative (FR) Accomplishments:

- At Argonne-East, FRs completed all related corrective actions due in 2002 resulting from the May 2002 inspection by the Office of Independence Oversight and Performance Assurance.
- At Argonne-West, an FR observed that compliance with ISM guiding principles of line management responsibility and clear roles and responsibilities has improved at the Argonne-West Fuel Manufacturing Facility (FMF). It was previously observed that an FMF job supervisor was not fully cognizant of the work activity he was supervising and had not assigned sufficiently knowledgeable personnel to perform the work. In addition, the FR had pointed out to the job supervisor that procedural inadequacies were not corrected before commencement of the work. The FR verified the above noted deficiencies had been addressed by directly observing subsequent work activities at FMF. The work observed was performed in accordance with proper ISM Guiding Principles and utilized an appropriately revised procedure.
- At Brookhaven, an FR participated in the Accelerator Readiness Review for the introduction of deuterons into the BNL Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider. Also, because of previously identified suspect/counterfeit parts issues related to ratcheting hold-down devices, an FR proposed more encompassing improvements to the BNL procurement process. A Brookhaven FR obtained a designation as a Certified Industrial Hygienist.
- At Oak Ridge, FRs performed surveillances of ongoing operational activities at Building 3019 and the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR).